Defeat and Division: France at War, 1939–1942 (Armies of the Second World War)

Excellent source and very detailed information. I highly recommend it.

This is an excellent study of the French Army, its makeup, performance and societal role, in the early period of WW2. The author brings to light many facts and details as to which I have to say, even after decades of reading WW2 history, I was pretty much unaware. I was totally unaware of the circumstances surrounding the 1MM+ French POW’s held in Germany. The author provides excellent details and analysis re the effect that this hostage situation had on politicians and the public at large. The author brings tremendous clarity to the complexities surrounding the Darlan Affair and he sorts out details and long term implications that other studies generally skim over. His review of the French Army preparations and performance in 1939-1940 is very interesting and he does a better job than I have ever seen of describing the debilitating effect that the “Phony War” (the “Sitzkreig”) had on the morale and ultimately the performance of the citizen soldiers.The negatives exist. The author assumes from the outset that you have a pretty solid knowledge of WW2 history and pre war French politics. He jumps right into things and does not proceed with baby steps. Many readers will be left behind at a number of points - as I was at times. Adding to this problem, he readily throws in French phrases without translation so you are pretty much on your own unless you keep a word and phrase source handy. The author, to his credit, describes the views held by other authors and provides them with solid attribution but this can get tiresome when many pages seem to simply present one summary after another of what particular writers have said on the subject. At times he leaves you hanging - giving no clue as to which of many interpretations he believes is correct. Finally, and this may be just me, I found the syntax and sentence structure of the first 100+ pages to be very difficult to read and follow. After a time, either he improved or I just got used to it. Funny, many authors conclude their introduction by thanking a spouse or a friend for reading the text over and providing suggestions to improve clarity and readability. In my opinion, he really could have used a spouse or a friend for this book.Now having set out what may look like forbidding negatives, let me emphasize again that the contents are exceptionally good, you will learn a lot and your eyes will really be opened on a number of subjects. For all its faults, an excellent addition to WW2 history.

Covers the division between French who fought for the allies and the ones that fought for the axis

I am working on a study of the Tunisian campaign, which began with the TORCH landings in Algeria and Morocco on 8 November 1942. I had often wondered why the French defended Oran so fiercely, gave up Algiers without much of a struggle, and battled vainly but valiantly for Morocco. losing more soldiers in almost every engagement with the Americans but continuing to fight after their navy and air force had been blasted from the sky and seas.Before I get too far into this review, let me point out that Porch talks about the Army, Navy and Air Force, not just the Army. Also, for those wondering why the book ends in 1942 - it does not. This book is Volume 1 of a two volume set.I must also caution potential readers that this work is not a combat narrative. Face it, the French Army fought for six weeks in 1940, about that long in 1941 against the British and three days against the Americans in 1942 before rejoining the allies. The Gaullist Free French, who represented a much smaller number of service members, spent even less time in combat albeit they performed well at Bir Hachiem against the Afrika Korps in summer 1942. So, not a lot of combat to talk about. That said, Porch offers new insights into the French Army's performance during these battles. Some of them quite surprising.What does Porch examine in lieu of numerous campaign studies? He looks at the personalities and psychology of the French military in typically thorough fashion. I came away convinced that if any military force suffered from bipolar disorder, it would be the French following the end of World War 1. This is partly due to "victory disease" which stifled innovation after 1918, partly due to the volatile political situation in France, and finally the extraordinarily rigid and close minded views of senior military officers. Throw in the usual cut-throat battling for funding between the Army, Navy and Air Force during the global depression in the 1920s and 1930s and its a recipe for defeat. Literally.Porch does english speaking readers a favor by delving into personalities, with special emphasis on Petain and Darlan - both key figures in the Vichy regime. He also talks about the 1.2 million POWs taken in 1940 that were never returned to France. Did Petain and his minions fight for their return? No. The Vichy regime made a deal for 43,000 officers, but all of the rest of the prisoners taken in the 1940 campaign remained in German captivity. What is more, they were told that their service was honorable only if they obeyed German orders and did not try to escape.The tremendous tension between the Gaullists and Vichyites is also examined in detail. I was surprised, well sorta, that De Gaulle did not attract many people to the Free French during the initial months following the armistice because he had a deserved reputation as a martinet among prewar French soldiers.Porch also points out that the French cooperated whole heartedly with the Germans between the armistice and TORCH landings, exploding myth after myth about how Vichy officers were burning for revenge when in fact they were willing partners and in some cases joined the Germans as volunteer soldiers fighting the Russians.There is a plethora of nuggets of information that are both illuminating and fascinating. The French colonies that rallied to De Gaulle did not do so out of patriotism, but for far more practical reasons - the Allies controlled the seas and therefore could cut off those colonies from merchant ship trade at will. The colonies where the French had stationed warships were the ones that remained true to Petain.This is a book that features a lot of discussion about individual and collective psychology. It might be a bit offputting at first, but one cannot otherwise understand what appears at first glance to be contradictory and otherwise incomprehensible actions on the part of Vichy.Porch has succeeded admirably in painting a convincing picture that defeat brought out the worst in the French military in 1940. I am very much looking forward to reading how the French sought to redeem their honor after rallying to the allied cause following the Axis occupation of Vichy.Recommended with a caveat that readers with a serious interest in the topic will find this book fascinating. Those who do not know much about the subject might be drowned by or at least thoroughly soaked by the firehose of detailed information delivered by Douglas Porch.