The Logic of Scientific Discovery

"The Logic of Scientific Discovery", first published in German in 1935 by Karl Popper, (1902-1994), opened a new way in the philosophy of science.He began his epistemological work with "The Two Fundamental Problems of the Theory of Knowledge" (unpublished immediately), and he gave a summary of it in the first edition of his "Logic". The two main problems of Popper's logic are those of induction and of demarcation. Induction is the first one, or the problem of Hume with the first objection of Kant, the second problem is concerning the separation between science and pseudo-science ( i.e. essentially metaphysics, marxism, and psychoanalysis). He realized later that it was the same problem.So, since Bacon ("Novum Organum") until the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Schlick, Wittgenstein), the scientific research was for Popper in a wrong way. In their scientific approach the authors of the Vienna Circle did adopt a criterion of meaning (and with verification) in order to divide the two sorts of propositions: scientifical versus metaphysical, to stay in the truth of science. For Popper, the scientific discovery is an unended process of trial and error, in testing hypothesis or theories, with the survival of the best ones through the means of the falsification or the refutation. It is an objective knowledge, but we can never speak of truth, we can only be confident in the theories (or conjectures) which have resisted to the strongest tests. It is a matter of "corroboration", with deductions, until a new theory is about to supersede the previous one (Newton, Einstein...).Popper developed a new epistemology upon his logic of conjectures and refutations in scientific progress, he called it "critical rationalism", with free discussion between the scientists,(against empiricism and non-critical rationalism), and finally it led him up to an evolutionary theory of knowledge in philosophy of science.

But it is hard to understand

This is probably Popper's most famous work, in which he lays out his philosophy of science, focusing on the question of epistemology.The book begins in a surprisingly accessible manner. I was expected some very high level philosophy that would be difficult to understand, but the translation is very easy to follow. Where he gets a little more obscure, he brings it back down-to-earth with examples that help to put his argument in context. I would describe the argument that Popper creates as being cumulative; that is, there are lots of references to earlier sections and, in particular, definitions.For this reason, I would not recommend reading this book over a long period of time. I think it demands to be read quite intensively in as short a time as possible in order to ensure that one may follow it all.The main thrust of Popper's argument is to say that theories are never verified, they can only be falsified. He dismantles the positivist point of view which led to empiricism and shows empiricism reduces to mere psychologism. From here, he then needs to discuss the degree of falsifiability. He considers a theory to be less likely the more ways it can possibly falsified. From here, what I think he should have done would then be to talk about corroboration and how a theory stands up to attempts to falsify it. Unfortunately, he leaves this to the end and instead goes off on a rather long and tortuous talk about probability.This quite long section was the downside for me, as his discussion (and in particular, notation) was quite obscurantist, making it difficult to follow and quite oblique. From here, he moves on to talk about quantum mechanics and in particular the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.This brings me to my last point. If his theory is to be thought of as a scientific theory at all, then it must play by its own rules. That is to say, there must be a set of singular statements from this theory that can, in principle at least, be subject to testing to see if they can be falsified. Such a set of statements is not presented to the reader, so I could only conclude that while Popper's contribution is to be valued and considered, it doesn't constitute a scientific theory. It remains an application of metaphysics.

The perfect gift for a scientific mind

If you're buying this then you already know all about it.

It is not a good quality book in terms of materials.The content it's great and opening the minds of all the narrow minds in the world. Really complicated for my poor mind but, hopefully I got the main points.

Book arrived as expected and on time.

seminal book - fast delivery!

Good quality paper and print, and for the content: it's a Popper book!

Ótimo estado de conservação e envio rápido.

Many important scholars have discussed and are still discussing the demarcation issue. What distinguishes science from non-science. Popper’s criterion has two distinct advantages. First, it is a priori. It does not wait for the project to unravel but informs you in advance on its scientific substance. Second, it has an appeal to non-philosophical common sense. If a theory cannot be subjected to credible testing, it is not scientific. This simple statement is one that everyone can understand.There is no way to know a priori whether Popper’s falsifiability is an inherent property of the theory or a property of human capabilities. A theory can be unfalsifiable within the current state of knowledge, technology and experimental capabilities but can become falsifiable, thus scientific, with technological progress years or centuries later. We can have therefore a “conditional falsifiability” upon the condition that a gap in our knowledge will be filled at some point in the future. In our testing of the theory we should err on the safe side, that is the side that favors the theory and views falsifiability as a property of human capabilities.This is not just stimulating reading, it is a "must read" for anyone engaged in scientific work.

The Logic of Scientific Discovery is a deserved classic. Rarely has the genius of one man been able to so transform the tradition of scientific interpretation as Popper did. But since Popper has so many contemporary advocates I thought in this review I could suggest some problems or misinterpretations in his thought. Others have already explained his contributions with enthusiasm.First, Popper is often seen as advocating a skeptical way of life--the principle of falsification is made to mean that one should always try to falsify one's one own theories and worldview. There may be some support for this philosophy in the Open Society but not in the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Here, Popper is explicit that he is not proffering a philosophy of life but a methodology for science.Another related misconception is that Popper does not contend that his logic is the way science has historically progressed. The Logic of Scientific Discovery is explicit that it is normative. It argues not how science has progressed but how it should progress. The fact that Popper was so personally authoritarian that the line among his students was that his other major work should have been called "The Open Society by One of Its Enemies" seems eerily consistent with a philosophy professor dictating to scientists how they should conduct their work.And here is where I find the work someone dated. Popper argues against the inductivism epitomized by John Maynard Keynes but seems oblivious to the work of statisticians like Ronald Fisher. Fisher, with his method of randomized experimentation was able to show the validity of inductive causal inferences. In the 1970s statisticians like Rubin extended these inductive arguments to observational studies. Meta-analyses using Bayesian inference have also shown then value of induction. Obviously, Popper cannot be held responsible for not recognizing the Rubin causal model. His inattention to Fisher, however, is troubling since he was a contemporary.Most social science continues to progress within the Fisher/Neyman framework along with Bayesian advances. To be honest, Popper's work in this domain can seem as passé as the inductivism of Keynes.That the Logic is a work of genius is indubitable. I would argue, however, that falsification is not the one valid method for science. A fortiori it is not a philosophy of life all human beings must follow.

I am really disappointed: the book itself is great (Popper was a genius and wrote very clearly), but this kindle-edition is full of typos and mistakes which render it almost incomprehensible in its most technical (math and statistics) parts. I strongly advise against the purchase of this e-book: buy it in the paper form! Who was in charge of preparing the kindle-edition did and awfully sloppy and poor job! The worst money spent on an e-book ever!